### 1nc

#### Interpretation – engagement requires sustained government-to-government interaction

**Sheen, 2** – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” <http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf>)

Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jung’s policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for understanding President Kim’s engagement policy towards the North. In general, engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### Violation – the plan does not increase government contacts but rather decreases sanctions which may result in engagement

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1. Ground – positive engagement with the state is what all links are based on – lifting sanctions doesn’t guarantee any interaction which kills all disads**

#### **2. Predictable limits – they allow infinite tiny sanctions affs that could interact with the private sector – this makes topic prep impossible**

#### **3. Effects t is a voter – we can’t predict the internal link chain that makes them topical**

### 1nc

#### The affirmative takes the position of the Maoist, critiquing the structures that shape their lives – their knowledge production is necessarily homogenizing and draws capital from the others’ deprivation

**Chow 93** - Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Duke (Rey, Indiana University of Press, “Writing Diaspora,” 1993, p12-15, Google Books accessed 12/9/2013) //RGP \*edited for ablest language

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way ¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non-West, the Maoist turns precisely the "dis-dained" other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a gen-eralized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West. "21 Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valo-rization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subal-ternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a West-ern European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a rad-¶ ical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report expe-riences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses " raised. " In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence as representation is not an easy one for most academies to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order."22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were "oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation." As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception. The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non-Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraelis "The East is a career,"23 they remain ~~blind~~ to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

#### The alternative is to vote negative to engage in academic exile – we must disengage the structures they critique and question our privilege to speak in the first place – rejection of the academy is a prerequisite to solvency

**Biswas 7** – politics at Whitman (Shampa, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium 36)

Said has written extensively and poignantly about his own exilic conditions as a Palestinian schooled in the Western literary canon and living in the heart of US empire.27 But more importantly, he has also articulated exile as a ‘style of thought and habitation’ which makes possible certain kinds of ontological and epistemological openings. Speaking of exile as a ‘metaphorical condition’,28 Said describes it as ‘the state of never being fully adjusted’, of ‘always feeling outside’, of ‘restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’, of ‘a kind of curmudgeonly disagreeableness’. Exile, he says, ‘is the condition that characterizes the intellectual as someone who is a marginal figure outside the comforts of privilege, power, being-at-homeness’.29 Not just ‘foreigners’ but ‘lifelong members of a society’, can be such ‘outsiders’, so that ‘(e)ven if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and comfortable’.30 What Said privileges here is an intellectual orientation, rather than any identarian claims to knowledge; there is much to learn in that for IR scholars. In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans.31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination.32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad.34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own.35 It is fair to say that the jostling and unsettling of the nation-state that critical International Relations scholars have contributed to has still done little to dislodge the centrality of the nation-state in much of International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses. Raising questions about the state-centricity of intellectual works becomes even more urgent in the contemporary context in which the hyperpatriotic surge following the events of 11 September 2001 has made considerable inroads into the US academy. The attempt to make the academy a place for the renewal of the nation-state project is troubling in itself; for IR scholars in the US, such attempts can only limit the reach of a global sensibility precisely at a time when such globality is even more urgently needed. Said warns against the inward pull of patriotism in times of emergency and crisis, and argues that even for an intellectual who speaks for a particular cause, the task is to ‘universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others’.36 He is adamant that this is the case even for beleaguered groups such as the Palestinians whose very survival is dependent on formulating their demands in a nationalist idiom.37 American intellectuals, as members of a superpower with enormous global reach and where dissension in the public realm is noticeably absent, carry special responsibility in this regard.38 What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’,39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable.40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological givenness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’.41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

### 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government should condition substantially increasing its Economic Engagement with Cuba by repealing Section 211 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1998, Public law 105-277 on the Republic of Cuba agreeing to implement environmental regulations in Cuba

#### Conditioning the Embargo on Environmental protection solves the aff - is key to environmental leadership. Lifting the embargo alone dooms the environment.

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

Unlike the U.S., which still has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to 2008. This decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse Cuba’s substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana, Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist. Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public image in the international arena. The developmental assistance and economic growth potential that might stem from a U.S.-Cuba partnership might aid in developing enforceable implementation strategies. Even though Cuba’s written regulations characteristically lack feasible, implementable standards. Cuban laws, currently in effect, do provide a foundation for greater conservation activity in the future. The Cuban government does show an interest in encouraging sustainable development initiatives in the future, yet its laws are all based on maintaining a centralized government featuring a command economy. For example, CITMA appears to be trying to affect change, but many aspects of Cuba’s bureaucracy are rooted in the past and it remains difficult to update the ways of an outdated administrative substructure. If the embargo is lifted without a robust partnership and plans for environmental sustainability, the invasion of U.S. consumerism may seriously damage the island.

#### The impact is extinction – its linear

**Diner 94** – Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army

[David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, LN]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### solvency

#### Capitalism is sustainable and inevitable

**Goklany 7**-Julia Simon Fellow @ the Political Economy Research Center [Indur, Reason.com, “Now for the Good News,” 3/23/2007, <http://reason.com/archives/2007/03/23/now-for-the-good-news>]

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset ofmajor disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies.This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

#### Extinction outweighs all even a one percent risk - outweighs moral imperatives.

**Bostrom** 20**05** (Professor of Philosophy @ Oxford (Nick, <http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44> I had to translate this by listening and typing (4:30-5:52) and I know it’s annoying so if you email me I’ll send you the unformatted text, MT)

Now if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percent point, not very much, that’s equivalent to sixty million lives saves if we just count the current generation living generation, so thats a large number if we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up then the figure becomes astronomical, if we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe, the virgo supercluster, maybe it will take us a hundred million years to get there but if we go extinct we never will then even a one percentage point reduction in extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number 10^32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative, philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant the only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. Even if you just look at the current people and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct it should still be a high priority.

### ptx

#### Short-term market mechanisms are the only solution to environmental destruction

**Bryant 12**—professor of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity, 5/11/12, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

Somewhere or other Latour makes the remark that we’ll never do better than a politician. Here it’s important to remember that for Latour– as for myself –every entity is a “politician”. Latour isn’t referring solely to those persons that we call “politicians”, but to all entities that exist. And if Latour claims that we’ll never do better than a politician, then this is because every entity must navigate a field of relations to other entities that play a role in what is and is not possible in that field. In the language of my ontology, this would be articulated as the thesis that the local manifestations of which an entity is capable are, in part, a function of the relations the entity entertains to other entities in a regime of attraction. The world about entities perpetually introduces resistances and frictions that play a key role in what comes to be actualized. ¶ It is this aphorism that occurred to me today after a disturbing discussion with a rather militant Marxist on Facebook. I had posted a very disturbing editorial on climate change by the world renowned climate scientist James Hansen. Not only did this person completely misread the editorial, denouncing Hansen for claiming that Canada is entirely responsible for climate change (clearly he had no familiarity with Hansen or his important work), but he derided Hansen for proposing market-based solutions to climate change on the grounds that “the market is the whole source of the problem!” It’s difficult to know how to respond in this situations.¶ read on! ¶ It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, other systems of production have also produced devastating climate problems). In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological.¶ However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now. We can’t afford to reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible. As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

#### Capitalism prevents conflict --- prefer our evidence --- its backed by comprehensive studies

**Gartzke 07**, associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, 07 (Erik, “The Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science 51:1, 1/07, JSTOR)//AS

The discovery that democracies seldom fight each other has led, quite reasonably, to the conclusion that democ- racy causes peace, at least within the community of liberal polities. Explanations abound, but a consensus account of the dyadic democratic peace has been surprisingly slow to materialize. I offer a theory of liberal peace based on capi- talism and common interstate interests. Economic devel- opment, capital market integration, and the compatibility of foreign policy preferences supplant the effect of democ- racy in standard statistical tests of the democratic peace. In fact, after controlling for regional heterogeneity, any one of these three variables is sufficient to account for effects previously attributed to regime type in standard samples of wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and fatal disputes.' If war is a product of incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack dif- ferences worthy of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that state interests are inherently incompatible, but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least three attributes of mature capitalist economies. First, the historic impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are more expediently enticed than conquered. Land does little to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when incompatible policy objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of warfare. Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post-World War II period further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace. The notion of a capitalist peace is hardly new. Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and othersaw in market forces the power to end war. Unfortu- nately, war continued, leading many to view as overly op- timistic classical conceptions of liberal peace. This study can be seen as part of an effort to reexamine capitalist peace theory, revising arguments in line with contempo- rary insights much as Kantian claims were reworked in response to evolving evidence of a democratic peace. Existing empirical research on the democratic peace, while addressing many possible alternatives, provides an incomplete and uneven treatment of liberal economic processes. Most democratic peace research examines trade in goods and services but ignores capital markets and of- fers only a cursory assessment of economic development (Maoz and Russett 1992). Several studies explore the im- pact of interests, though these have largely been dismissed by democratic peace advocates (Oneal and Russett 1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). These omissions or oversights help to determine the democratic peace result and thus shape subsequent research, thinking, and policy on the subject of liberal peace. This study offers evidence that liberal economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the well-documented role of liberal pol- itics. Democracy cohabitates with peace. It does not, by itself, lead nations to be less conflict prone, not even to- ward other democracies. The argument and evidence provided here are bound to draw criticism. Skepticism in the face of controversial claims is natural, reasonable, even essential for the cumu- lation of knowledge. The democratic peace observation is supported by an exceptionally large and sophisticated body of research.2 At the same time, excessive deference to previous conclusions privileges conventional wisdom.3 A willingness to doubt that which we have come to believe is a hallmark of scientific inquiry. Indeed, the weight of existing evidence does not directly contradict this study as previous research has typically failed to address the claims of classical liberal political economists like Mon- tesquieu, Richard Cobden, and Norman Angell. As with previous research, this study finds support for a liberal peace, though the key causal variables, and some major policy implications, are considerably changed.

### adv

#### No solvency – a single round produces virtually no change

**Atchison and Panetta 5** (Jarrod, PhD Candidate – U Georgia, and Ed, Professor of Communication – U Georgia, “Activism in Debate: Parody, Promise, and Problems”, NCA Paper)

The first problem is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc…), rarely does any one debate have the power to create community wide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems inherent in individual debates and the collective forgetfulness of the debate community. The structural problems are clear. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge or a few scouts. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but the ballot is rarely seen by anyone outside the tabulation room. Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is little documentation available for use in many cases. During the period when judges interact with the debaters there are often external pressures (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc…) that restrict the ability for anyone outside the debate to pay attention to why a judge voting a particular way. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously and travel schedules dictate that most of the tournament has left by the later elimination rounds. We find it difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems. In addition to the structural problems, the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces the impact that individual debates have on the community. The debate community has a high turnover rate. Despite the fact that some debaters make their best effort to debate for more than four years, the debate community is largely made up of participants who debate and then move on. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the community when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. We do not mean to suggest that the activity is reinvented every year—certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, given the fact that there are virtually no transcriptions available for everyone to read, it is difficult to assume that the debate community would remember any individual debate. Additionally, given the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than what argument they won a particular round on. The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong collective memory of individual debates. We believe that the combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue that is recorded and/or transcribed. The second major problem with attempting to create community change in individual debates is that the debate community is made up of more individuals than the four debaters and one judge that are a part of every debate. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community have very little space for engaging in a discussion about community issues. We suspect that this helps explain why so few debaters get involved in the edebates over activist strategies. Coaches and directors dominant this forum because there is so little public dialogue over the issues that directly affect the community that they have dedicated so much of their professional and personal lives. This is especially true for coaches and directors that are not preferred judges and therefore do not even have a voice at the end of a debate. Coaches and directors should have a public forum to engage in a community conversation with debaters instead of attempting to take on their opponents through the wins and losses of their own debaters.

#### Moral obligation flips neg – Capitalism is better at promoting fairness and equality to the poor rather than any alternative—History proves

**Bartholomew, 06**- Author of 'The Welfare State we’re In' he is also a writer and columnist for the Daily Telegraph (James Bartholomew, “We need a revision course on why capitalism is a good thing” May 24th, 2006, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

Capitalism has made us richer and given us the opportunity of vastly more diverse experiences. Even in my own lifetime, I have seen the normal length of holidays rise from one or two weeks to four or five weeks. Foreign travel that was unknown for most working people two centuries ago is now commonplace. Did government direction make this possible? Of course not. Most families now have cars. Read Thomas Hardy's novels and you find that people are always walking. Walking can be healthy and pleasant, but the average family of Hardy's time did not have a choice. Who invented cars? Who refined their design and manufacture to the point where they are affordable by millions of people? Not governments. The diverse, resourceful, determined power of capitalism. Why does the system work? Because it provides incentives and motivation. If you invent something, you may get fame and fortune. If you supply food or cars cheaper, you get more customers. Simple enough. Provide a good product or service at a low price and you have a business. That simple logic means capitalism tends to produce good products and services at better prices. What about the argument that capitalism promotes inequality? Let's remember, before even starting to answer, just how disastrous were the attempts in the 20th century to impose equality. Farmers in Leninist Russia were prosecuted and in many cases killed. Tens of millions died under communist rule in China. And after all the oppression and suffering, there was still no equality. There was the privileged ruling class with, in Russia's case, special dachas in the country and road lanes in town. Imposing equality is not an easy ride. It is oppressive and doomed to failure. Capitalism, meanwhile, has claims, at the least, to reducing inequality over time. The inequality was enormous when George III was sitting on his gilded throne in 1806, with thousands of servants and farm workers and other underlings at his beck and call, while elsewhere in the country were those who could barely find enough to eat and, in some cases, died of hunger. Nowadays, more than nine out of 10 young people have mobile phones, 99 per cent of households have colour televisions, most households have cars. Yes, the rich are still with us. But the contrast in financial wealth has been greatly reduced over the long term. That was not due to any government, let alone a deliberate attempt to promote equality. It was achieved by capitalism. Why is the system now taken for granted and despised? Perhaps it is because the collapse of the communist states has removed from our sight useful reminders of how vastly superior capitalism is to state control. We should be careful.

#### Transitioning away from capitalism would collapse civilization and causes extinction

**Rockwell 8** (Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., President of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008 [“Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” Ludwig von Mises Institute, May 18th, Available Online at <http://mises.org/story/2982> Pismarov)

Whatever the specifics of the case in question, socialism always means overriding the free decisions of individuals and replacing that capacity for decision making with an overarching plan by the state. Taken far enough, this mode of thought won't just spell an end to opulent lunches. It will mean the end of what we all know as civilization itself. It would plunge us back to a primitive state of existence, living off hunting and gathering in a world with little art, music, leisure, or charity. Nor is any form of socialism capable of providing for the needs of the world's six billion people, so the population would shrink dramatically and quickly and in a manner that would make every human horror ever known seem mild by comparison. Nor is it possible to divorce socialism from totalitarianism, because if you are serious about ending private ownership of the means of production, you have to be serious about ending freedom and creativity too. You will have to make the whole of society, or what is left of it, into a prison. In short, the wish for socialism is a wish for unparalleled human evil. If we really understood this, no one would express casual support for it in polite company. It would be like saying, you know, there is really something to be said for malaria and typhoid and dropping atom bombs on millions of innocents.

#### Capitalist privatization is key to space exploration and colonization.

**Garmong, 05** – PhD in philosophy (Richard, Cap Mag, “Privatize Space Exploration,” <http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4327>)

As NASA scrambles to make the July 31 window for the troubled launch of space shuttle Discovery, we should recall the first privately funded manned spacecraft, SpaceShipOne, which over a year ago shattered more than the boundary of outer space: it destroyed forever the myth that space exploration can only be done by the government. Two years ago, a Bush Administration panel on space exploration recommended that NASA increase the role of private contractors in the push to permanently settle the moon and eventually explore Mars. Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that NASA will consider the true free-market solution for America's expensive space program: complete privatization. There is a contradiction at the heart of the space program: space exploration, as the grandest of man's technological advancements, requires the kind of bold innovation possible only to minds left free to pursue the best of their creative thinking and judgment. Yet, by funding the space program through taxation, we necessarily place it at the mercy of bureaucratic whim. The results are written all over the past twenty years of NASA's history: the space program is a political animal, marked by shifting, inconsistent, and ill-defined goals. The space shuttle was built and maintained to please clashing special interest groups, not to do a clearly defined job for which there was an economic and technical need. The shuttle was to launch satellites for the Department of Defense and private contractors--which could be done more cheaply by lightweight, disposable rockets. It was to carry scientific experiments--which could be done more efficiently by unmanned vehicles. But one "need" came before all technical issues: NASA's political need for showy manned vehicles. The result, as great a technical achievement as it is, was an over-sized, over-complicated, over-budget, overly dangerous vehicle that does everything poorly and nothing well. Indeed, the space shuttle program was supposed to be phased out years ago, but the search for its replacement has been halted, largely because space contractors enjoy collecting on the overpriced shuttle without the expense and bother of researching cheaper alternatives. A private industry could have fired them--but not so in a government project, with home-district congressmen to lobby on their behalf.

#### Space colonization means we survive global nuclear war, bioweapon use, and environmental destruction.

**Koschara, 01** – Major in Planetary Studies\ (Fred, L5 Development Group, <http://www.l5development.com/fkespace/financial-return.html>)

Potentially one of the greatest benefits that may be achieved by the space colonies is nuclear survival, and the ability to live past any other types of mass genocide that become available. We have constructed ourselves a house of dynamite, and now live in fear that someone might light a match. If a global nuclear war were to break out, or if a deadly genetic experiment got released into the atmosphere, the entire human race could be destroyed in a very short period of time. In addition, many corporate attitudes seem concerned with only maximizing today's bottom line, with no concern for the future. This outlook leads to dumping amazingly toxic wastes into the atmosphere and oceans, a move which can only bring harm in the long run. Humanity has to diversify its hold in the universe if it is to survive. Only through space colonization is that option available, and we had all best hope we're not to late.

# 2nc

#### Here’s a case list – they can be government contacts like trade agreements, aid, loans, or grants

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.¶

#### Normalizing trade relations with Cuba would be topical

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### 5. Debate is not about the specific education but rather having a limited discussion to instil critical thinking skills which outweighs all

**Tsui 2–** researcher for the Education Policy Center at the Urban Institute in Washington D.C. (Lisa, Fostering Critical Thinking Through Effective Pedagogy”, The Journal of Higher Education, 73.6 (2002) 740-763

http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/journal\_of\_higher\_education/v073/73.6tsui.html)

Although Americans today are more highly educated than ever before, they are not necessarily better educated. In this country formal education largely entails knowledge building through subject matter content coverage. Unfortunately, this often comes at the expense of skills building. Rather than devote so much effort to teaching students what to think, perhaps we need to do more to teach them how to think. Higher-order cognitive skills, such as the ability to think critically, are invaluable to students' futures; they prepare individuals to tackle a multitude of challenges that they are likely to face in their personal lives, careers, and duties as responsible citizens. Moreover, by instilling critical thinking in students we groom individuals to become independent lifelong learners—thus fulfilling one of the long-term goals of the educational enterprise. A preponderance of evidence from the research literature on critical thinking suggests that significant gains in critical thinking are both perceived (Astin, 1993; Pace, 1974; Terenzini, Theophilides, & Lorang, 1984; Tsui, 1999) and experienced by college students (Dressel & Mayhew, 1954; Keeley, 1992; Keeley, Browne, & Kreutzer, 1982; King, Wood, & Mines, 1990; Klassen, 1983; Lehmann, 1963; Mines, King, Hood, & Wood, 1990; Pascarella, 1989; Spaulding & Kleiner, 1992). Yet, many consider the level of critical thinking displayed by students to be inadequate. Norris (1985) noted that competence in critical thinking [End Page 740] is lower than it should be at every stage of schooling. In a study by Keeley, Browne, and Kreutzer (1982), seniors outperformed freshmen in analyzing articles through an essay response format despite showing "major deficiencies" in their performance. For instance, 40-60% of the participating seniors could not provide a single example of a logical flaw, significant ambiguity, or misuse of data, when asked to assess a written passage containing several such errors. Using the same data source, Keeley (1992) found both freshmen and seniors exhibiting "poor performance" at identifying assumptions. In a study involving 874 sociology students, Logan (1976) concluded that those at every level (from freshmen to graduate students) scored "very low" in critical thinking as measured by a test to assess students' abilities to recognize uncritical or unsound thinking.

#### Capitalism is the only moral economic system – gives individuals the right to choose and breeds moral responsibility to change existing world values

**Billings 83** (Donald B., Professor of Economics at Boise State University, The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, “The Moral Case for Competitive Capitalism”, July, http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=1277)

<Following the lead of the economist Benjamin Rogge, it is in fact the case that “. . . the most important part of the case for economic freedom is not its dramatic success in promoting economic growth, but rather its consistency with certain fundamental moral principles of life itself.”[7] For personal freedom, and therefore economic and political freedom, is not “ethically indifferent” but a necessary condition of morality. Friedrich Hayek reminds us of certain fundamental conditions of the moral life. It is . . . an old discovery that morals and moral values will grow only in an environment of freedom, and that, in general, moral standards of people and classes are high only where they have long enjoyed freedom—and proportional to the amount of freedom they have possessed . . . That freedom is the matrix required for the growth of moral values—indeed not merely one value among many but the source of all values—is almost self-evident. It is only where the individual has choice, and its inherent responsibility, that he has occasion to affirm existing values, to contribute to their further growth, and to earn moral merit.[8] Morality and the Market It appears that the free market system, in which only voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange are permitted, is a necessary condition for a moral order in which the integrity of the individual conscience is respected. Hayek points out in The Road to Serfdom that only: where we ourselves are responsible for our own interests . . . has our decision moral value. Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily recreated in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one’s conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion . . . and to bear the consequences of one’s own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name.[9] “Surely,” adds Hayek on another occasion, “it is unjust to blame a system as more materialistic because it leaves it to the individual to decide whether he prefers material gain to other kinds of excellence.”[10] Whatever the goals of individuals, whether virtuous or not, the “vulgar calculus of the marketplace” still seems to be the most humane way mankind has found for dealing with the economic problems of scarcity and the difficult allocation of resources. Murray Rothbard forcefully reminds us that “. . . in a world of voluntary social cooperation through mutually beneficial exchanges . . . it is obvious that great scope is provided for the development of social sympathy and human friendships.” Indeed, “it is far more likely that feelings of friendship and communion are the effects of a regime of contractual social cooperation rather than the cause.”[11] Capitalism tends to favor those who respect the sanctity of their contracts because of the respect for and enforcement of private property rights. The work ethic; encouraged by the institution of private property, represents an important source of moral responsibility as well as a continuous reminder that our actions always entail costs—a pervasive characteristic of human existence. These essential ingredients of a free market order, Arthur Shenfield tells us, define a set of social institutions which encourages mutual respect for each and every individual. What we want above all for ourselves, and which therefore we must accord to our neighbor, is freedom to pursue our own purposes . . . As a corollary to this freedom we want others to respect our individuality, independence, and status as responsible human beings . . . This is the fundamental morality which capitalism requires and which it nurtures. It alone among economic systems operates on the basis of respect for free, independent responsible persons. All other systems in varying degrees treat men as less than this.[12]>

#### Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs

**Martin 10** (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

#### Extinction - we have to go to space

**Garan, 10** – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon/, JMP)

Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

# 1nr

#### Permanent state of exception that is the root cause of the death ethics of war and underwrites a hellish existence where death, murder, war, rape, and racism are ordinary

**Maldonado-Torres 8** [Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 217-21]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war—which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries—into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a "state of exception" in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben's diagnosis, one must say that the colony--long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination--served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity, thereby revealing its darkest secrets." It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism (and not only national socialisms or forms of fascism) that allow the "state of exception" to continue to define ordinary relations in this, our so-called postmodern world. ¶ Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life. In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort." In the racial/ colonial world, the "hell" of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves, which Fanon referred to as the damnes de la terre (condemned of the earth). The damne (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent "hell," and as such, this figure serves as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war. The hell of the condemned is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather signals the dispensability of racialized subjects, that is, the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them. The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. The condemned, in short, inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their "hell" is not simply "other people," as Sartre would have put it-at least at one point - but rather racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line. Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape. ¶ The modern function of race and the coloniality of power, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism." This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects-for example, indigenous and black-as part of the enterprise of colonization. From here one could as well refer to them as the death ethics of war. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego, and the primary targets of this rape are women. But men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. Racialization functions through gender and sex, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well." Dussel. who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. ¶ And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered ... a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. "Males," Bartolome de las Casas writes, are reduced through "the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom"; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, "in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.""5 The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable. And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized, which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization. The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women. As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color. As Joy James notes, "its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male [and/or white] as normative in order to enforce a politicaljracial, economic, cultural. sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superior." The warfront has always been a "feminized" and "colored" space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations ... Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent," Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.” The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women's bodies are hardly accidental. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime." He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: I) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women's labor-including reproduction." My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a "normal" world. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. ¶ Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. "Killability" and "rapeability" are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no lirnits.?" Mythical depiction of the black man's penis is a case in point: the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous. In short, the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be sure, any amount of "penis" in either one represents a threat, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape- "raping" -while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape- "being raped." In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences-in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families-just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act. Both "raping" and "being raped" are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and erotic, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise." "Killability" and "rapeability" are part of their essence, understood in a phenomenological way. The "essence" of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world. In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war." This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war--particularly slavery, murder, and rape--are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism, as Fanon suggested."

#### Their failure to recognize privilege turns case and means there’s only a risk they recreate capitalist exploitation

**Chow 93** - Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Duke (Rey, Indiana University of Press, “Writing Diaspora,” 1993, p118-119, Google Books accessed 12/9/2013) //RGP

For "third world" intellectuals, the lures of diaspora consist in this masked hegemony. As in the case of what I call masculinist positions in the China field, their resort to "minority discourse," including the discourse of class and gender struggles, veils their own fatherhood over the "ethnics" at home even while it continues to legitimize them as "ethnics" and "minorities" in the West. In their hands, minority discourse and class struggle, especially when they take the name of another nation, another culture, another sex, or another body, turn into signifiers whose major function is that of discursive exchange for the intellectuals' self-profit. Like "the people," "real people," "the populace," "the peasants," "the poor," "the homeless," and all such names, these signifiers work insofar as they gesture toward another place (the lack in discourse-construction) that is "authentic" but that cannot be admitted into the circuit of exchange. . What happens eventually is that this "third world" that is produced, circulated, and purchased by "third world" intellectuals in the cosmopolitan diasporic space will be exported "back home" in the form of values—intangible goods—in such a way as to obstruct the development of the native industry. To be sure, one can perhaps no longer even speak of a "native industry" as such in the multinational corporate postmodernity, but it remains for these intellectuals to face up to their truthful relation to those "objects of study" behind which they can easily hide— as voyeurs, as "fellow victims," and as self-appointed custodians. Hence the necessity to read and write against the lures of diaspora: Any attempt to deal with "women" or the "oppressed classes" in the "third world" that does not at the same time come to terms with the historical conditions of its own articulation is bound to \* repeat the exploitativeness that used to and still characterizes most "exchanges" between "West" and "East." Such attempts will also be expediently assimilated within the plenitude of the hegemonic establishment, with all the rewards that that entails. No one can do without some such rewards. What one can do without is the illusion that, through privileged speech, one is helping to save the wretched of the earth.

#### Your role as a judge is to interrogate how we should resist forms of power that turn the other into an instrument of knowledge – we must deal with our privileged positions which allow us to speak in the first place – don’t evaluate questions of plan action

**Chow, ’93** - Professor Comparative Lit at Brown, (Rey, “Writing Diaspora” p 15-17 google books)//a-berg

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

#### Good intentions mean nothing – the suffering of the Other is always invoked from a position of privilege bent on salvation

**Nayar, 12** – law professor at the University of Warwick (Jayan, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority”, December 15, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-012-9115-8/fulltext.html>)//VP

We thinkers of hope find a sense of meaning in this—our responsibility as we think hope is to suffer the otherwise ‘useless suffering’ of the Other, and this, our suffering of suffering-as-such, directs the politics of hope and the hope for politics. With this Levinasian turn, hope is therefore sought to be reclaimed; the face of the Other in suffering prompts our philosophies of hope out of postmodernity’s banishments. Thus, we engage in repeatedly re-searching for meaning and content for fallen institutions. Given the multiple realities of despair that bombard us within fast changing worlds of social relations (of incredible interconnectedness and visibility) and the persistent and increasing realities of violence and depravation, the work of ‘ethical’ selves to ‘repair’, as Levinas would have it, the created institutions of equal freedom and formal justice, to correct the inevitable betrayals, by ‘the said’, of the ‘sayings’ of the suffering Other, continues with ever more urgency.5 In this, we who think for the Other are both equally moved by disappointment (that our being for the other through our thinking fails to correct the world) and aspirational hope (that our continued thinking is consistent with, and is integrally part of, this paradox of ethical failure). Such is the theory-neurosis that afflicts many of us philosophers of hope: how to return to ethics the inherently profane truths of politics? How to rectify the prevalence of denial within the world of possibilities? How, simply put, to meditate upon hope out of suffering? In Levinasian terms, our obsession, as we think for the Other (and all Others) is how to employ usefully our suffering of the ‘useless suffering’ of the Other. But this ‘persecution’ of the Self,6 of responsibility to suffer usefully for the Other, is, I venture, an affliction of those of us who theorise out of locations of privilege (both material and epistemic)—it is a Western(ised) ailment suffered by prospective missionaries or, as Ashis Nandy prefers, ‘priests’, of civil-isation (Nandy 2007). The privileging of a gaze upon the wretched’s suffering, is a privileged gaze**.** Notwithstanding the best of intentions in making such a gaze upon the face of suffering the foundation of hope, of theories of justice, rights, response and responsibility, despite the claim that this gaze subordinates the Self to the Other-as-Master, there is still a continuity here of an imperial philosophical pedigree; a continuity of the coloniality of ontology.

#### a) The aff commodifies the suffering of others for your ballot – this creates a debate economy where we use scenarios of suffering like chess pieces in our sick game – this creates worse intellectual imperialism

**Baudrillard 94** – dead French philosopher (Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71) //RGP

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### b) Their depictions of violence against women – ie. Maquiladoras - projects them as the victims in need of help – this justifies military interventions and counterproductive legal strategies

**Soderlund 5** - ssistant professor of media history in the University of Oregon's School of Journalism and Communication (Gretchen, Trafficking Round Table, “Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition,” Fall 2005, <http://traffickingroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Soderlund-Running-from-the-Rescuers.pdf>) //RGP

Too often Western feminists have participated in producing the victim subjects that state actors step in to protect through the deployment of military, legal, or law enforcement strategies. Victim discourse has been implicated in the creation of feminists' sometimes patronizing atti-tude toward nonWestern women onto whom victim status is projected (Mohanty 1991). Such a dynamic "encourages some feminists in the international arena to propose strategies which are reminiscent of impe-rial interventions into the lives of the native subject and which represent the 'Eastern' woman as a victim of a 'backward' and 'uncivilized' culture" (Kapur 2002, 6). Drawing on the case of Nepal—which has recently crimi-nalized the movement outside the country of women under 30 without a husband or male-guardian's permission as a means of combating traf-ficking—Kapur suggests that solutions in the realm of law enforcement are an essential component of such logic: "The construction of women exclusively through the lens of violence has triggered a spate of domestic and international reforms focused on the criminal law, which are used to justify state restrictions on women's rights—for the protection of women" (2002, 6). As we have seen in the case of Western-sponsored brothel raids, the United States is using the protection of women as a rationale to import its law enforcement tactics and project its power internationally, while conveniently merging these interests with a crackdown on the sexuality and rights of women. The emphasis on victimization in the West is historically linked to the exigencies of activist publicity around race and gender issues in the context of a masculinist state that exalted and protected only those vic-tims whose innocence—and distance from state-based oppression—could be established or asserted in sympathetic terms. At some historical moments these representations of innocent victims dovetail with the ter-ritorial interests of political actors, ushering in what Iris Marion Young has recently referred to as a "security regime" (2003), in which the state takes on the seemingly benevolent role of protector. Focusing primar-ily on abuses like violence against women and organizing around them as though they were the only distinctly gendered form of human rights violation, ultimately casts women as victims in need of protection from harm rather than as subjects deserving of positive rights. Emphasizing the most abject victims, while often an important and efficacious activist strategy, runs the risk of mobilizing media and governmental institutions in protectionist scenarios that overshadow demands for other forms of social and economic rights (and, in this case, the creation of laws that do not construe sex as inherently dangerous for women).

#### c) The 1AC subscribes to a politics of publicity that equates democratic outcomes with acts of exposure and revelation – this mode of political engagement reinforces edifices of domination that facilitate enhanced flows of information while evacuating possibilities for social transformation.

**Barney 8** [Darin, Canada Research Chair in Technology and Citizenship and Associate Professor of Communication Studies at McGill University, Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition, Volume 1, Issue 1, “Politics and Emerging Media: The Revenge of Publicity”, p. 101-102]

The complementarity of communicative capitalism and the normative framework of publicity thus sets a trap for those committed to the democratic ends of radical politicization and egalitarianism. The normative framework of publicity valorizes access to information, communication and participation. Communicative capitalism is nourished and sustained by the transaction of information, communication, and interactive participation. In a formulation that resonates with similar claims made by Agamben (2000), Žižek (1999), and Hardt and Negri (2000), Dean (2005: 56) notes that “communicative exchanges, rather than being fundamental to democratic politics, are the basic elements of capitalist production.” Norms of publicity are materialized in emerging media technologies that are instrumental to the extension and intensification of a political-economic order whose relationship to democratic outcomes is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, pernicious. It is not just that informing, communicating and participating in the forms afforded by emerging media technologies are inadequate relative to demanding conceptions of the political. It is that, in so doing, well-intentioned citizens simultaneously reinforce and legitimize a political-economic order that is arrayed systematically against the democratic ends they at least believe themselves to hold.¶ As Dean writes in her book Publicity’s Secret: ¶ The ideal of the public materializes an economy of transnational telecommunications corporations, media conglomerates, computer hardware, software and infrastructure developers, and content providers. Democratic potentials are thereby collapsed into increases in access and information. Democracy becomes indistinguishable from intensifications and extensions in the circulation of information. Our deepest commitments—to inclusion, equality and participation within a public—bind us into the practices whereby we submit to global capital. (2002: 151) ¶ Here, it is not just that emerging technologies are enlisted to ends that are other than democratic, it is that the principles of publicity themselves—participation, information and communication—offer us no way to distinguish democratic politics from enrollment in the prevailing rhythms and modes of a global economy structured in opposition to the ends of those politics. In this sense, publicity has become “the ideology of technoculture… a model of political life that would work just as well as a motto for Microsoft or AT&T” (Ibid: 4, 14). The ideals of publicity have conditioned us to desire and expect exactly what emerging technologies deliver: more information; more communication; more participation. Who could ask for more? Cruelly, even the practices of deeply politicized social movements, in making highly-effective use of these technologies for purposes of publicization, organization and mobilization, implicitly confirm the edifice they explicitly challenge. Put simply, “[i]n effect, changing the system—organizing against and challenging communicative capitalism—seems to require strengthening the system...Democracy demands publicity” (Ibid: 4).

#### d) The 1AC’s gesture of recognition toward the subaltern leaves UNTOUCHED the basic structures of oppression — this re-inscribes and legitimizes the coloniality of power – turns their coalition claims

**Maldonado-Torres 8** – Nelson Maldonado-Torres 8, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 148-50] //DDI13

It is not possible to understand fully the difference between Fanon's and Honneth's critical takes on Hegel without considering their divergent views on the human subject and on the subjective motivations behind the struggle for recognition. Honneth correctly argues that when Hegel articulated the notion of a struggle for recognition he was definitely leaving behind a tradition of social and political thought that went back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, according to which self-preservation played the primary motivating role in leading humans to form states, political bodies, and institutions. According to Hegel, conflicts among humans were not to be traced back to a motive of self-preservation, but, as Honneth describes them, to moral impulses-that is, to the recognition of one's identity and personality. What Hegel, however, continues to hold, in line with dominant trends of political theory in his time, and what Honneth does not examine in his critical reflections on Hegel, is the extent to which the "right of property" functions as the primary marker of self-identity and personality. As a result, the struggle for recognition becomes primarily a struggle to be recognized as a proprietor. Hegel inherits this idea from a liberal tradition that defined human fraternity in terms of the coexistence in a "civil society" of autonomous individuals with rights of property--Locke's felicitous definition. Consider that for the Hegel of the Jena writings what initiated the struggle between persons was "theft," which made it clear that a violation of property was viewed as a violation of the person. Honor could only be regained in a life-and-death struggle. What changes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that the life-and-death struggle, now subsumed in the dialectics of Spirit, gives rise to two modes of consciousness: one is independent and for-itself, while the other is dependent and takes the form of an object or thing; the former is lord, the latter is bondsman. Property becomes now a more complex category since even subjects can collapse into the category of objects, things, and possessions. The slave works on the property of the master and objectifies himself in it, while the master enjoys the product of the slave's work--from here comes the Marxist theory of alienation, which Marx later applied to economics and came up with the notion of surplus value. We have seen all of this already. What I want to add now is that there is a presumption that the relation between the subject and property is basic. Freedom is the objectification of the subjectivity of the individual. The end result of this is that the freedom and equality of the subject tend to collapse frequently into the claim for freedom and equality in the process of coming to possess something. We are free to possess what we want and equal in our chances to get what we want." This gives a dangerous self-referential character to the politics of recognition that threatens coalition politics and that more often than not leads only to minimal structural changes at the political and economic levels. The problem with the politics of recognition is therefore not so much that it dissolves questions of redistribution into questions of recognition as some have argued." The problem, in contrast, resides in self-centered claims for redistribution. In other words, the danger is w hen the struggle for recognition is reduced to questions about the respect, freedom, and equality of subjects who aim to overturn the system of lordship and bondage by coming finally to possess something of their own and to be recognized as proprietors. This conception of the struggle for recognition is fated to leave untouched the basic structure of the oppressive system that creates pathological modes of recognition and to hinder the chances for the formation of what has been aptly called "a coalition politics of receptive generosity.” In contrast to conceptions of the struggle for recognition articulated in terms of cultural identity or in terms of claims for possession and access to goods, Fanon discovered in his exploration of the lived experience of the black that one of the main challenges confronted by blacks in a racial society is not only that they are not recognized as people who can possess things, but that they are not recognized as people who can give things. Demands to be able to give are, in this respect, more radical than demands for possession. The master, under pressure, can allow the slave to have "things," but he will not recognize that he needs what the slave has. For the master, whatever the slave touches decreases in quality and value. Thus, even ifhe enters into commerce with the slave, the master will devalue the extent of the slave's contributions. Fanon was well aware of this dimension of the system of lordship and bondage. It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and of all those who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a Negro physician? As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace. I tell you, I was walled in: No exception was made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or my understanding of the quantum theory. (BSWM 1l7). Fanon suggests here that while coming to possess things or gaining abilities may be a necessary condition of the process of achieving liberation, it is certainly not sufficient and it should not become in itself the telos or goal of the process. The problem is that the logic of lordship and bondage may very well continue after formal concessions of rights of property. The master still resists opening himself to the Other and entering into the logic of ordinary ethical intersubjective contact. But why is it that the master resists accepting the gift or recognizing the Other as someone who can give? The answer should be clear by now: it makes evident the incompleteness of the master. Lordship requires impenetrability, while giving necessitates openness and receptivity. Giving in this sense represents the paradigmatic transgressive act. If giving is so dangerous it is not so much because it puts the other in debt, but because in the colonial context it requires an original act of openness that the master fundamentally resists." The master can easily pay any debt; what he cannot do is to open himself and to be receptive to the gift of the slave. This transaction violates the very meaning and purpose of the logic of lordship and bondage.